Creative Evolution
Henri Bergson
Translated by Arthur Mitchell
1998
Introduction<= o:p>
The history of the evolution of life, incomplete as it yet is, already reveals to us how the intellect has been formed, by an uninterrupted progre= ss, along a line which ascends through the vertebrate series up to man. It show= s us in the faculty of understanding an appendage of the faculty of acting, a mo= re and more precise, more and more complex and supple adaptation of the consciousness of living beings to the conditions of existence that are made= for them. Hence should result this consequence that our intellect, in the narrow sense of the word, is intended to secure the perfect fitting of our body to= its environment, to represent the relations of external things among themselves= -in short, to think matter. Such will indeed be one of the conclusions of the present essay. We shall see that the human intellect feels at home among inanimate objects, more especially among solids, where our action finds its fulcrum and our industry its tools; that our concepts have been formed on t= he model of solids; that our logic is, pre-eminently, the logic of solids; tha= t, consequently, our intellect triumphs in geometry, wherein is revealed the kinship of logical thought with unorganized matter, and where the intellect= has only to follow its natural movement, after the lightest possible contact wi= th experience, in order to go from discovery to discovery., sure that experien= ce is following behind it and will justify it invariably.
But from this it must also follow that our thought, in its purely logical form, is incapable of presenting the true nature of life, the full meaning = of the evolutionary
(x) movement. Created by life, in definite circumstances, to act on defi= nite things, how can it embrace life, of which it is only an emanation or an asp= ect? Deposited by the evolutionary movement in the course of its way, how can it= be applied to the evolutionary movement itself? As well contend that the part = is equal to the whole, that the effect can reabsorb its cause, or that the peb= ble left on the beach displays the form of the wave that brought it there. In f= act, we do indeed feel that not one of the categories of our thought-unity, multiplicity, mechanical causality, intelligent finality, etc.-- applies exactly to the things of life: who can say where individuality begins and e= nds, whether the living being is one or many, whether it is the cells which associate themselves into the organism or the organism which dissociates it= self into cells? In vain we force the living into this or that one of our molds.= All the molds crack. They are too narrow, above all too rigid, for what we try = to put into them. Our reasoning, so sure of itself among things inert, feels i= ll at ease on this new ground. It would be difficult to cite a biological discovery due to pure reasoning. And most often, when experience has finally shown us how life goes to work to obtain a certain result, we find its way = of working is just that of which we should never have thought.
Yet evolutionist philosophy does not hesitate to extend to the things of life the same methods of explanation which have succeeded in the case of unorganized matter. It begins by showing us in the intellect a local effect= of evolution, a flame, perhaps accidental, which lights up the coming and goin= g of living beings in the narrow passage open to their action; and lo! forgetting what it has just told us, it makes of this lantern glimmering in a tunnel a= Sun which can illuminate the world. Boldly it proceeds, with the powers of conceptual thought alone, to the ideal
(xi) reconstruction of all things, even of life. True, it hurtles in its course against such formidable difficulties, it sees its logic end in such strange contradictions, that it very speedily renounces its first ambition. " It is no longer reality itself," it says, "that it will reconstruct, but only an imitation of the real, or rather a symbolical imag= e; the essence of things escapes us, and will escape us always; we move among relations; the absolute is not in our province; we are brought to a stand before the Unknowable."But for the human intellect, after too much pri= de, this is really an excess of humility. If the intellectual form of the living being has been gradually modeled on the reciprocal actions and reactions of certain bodies and their material environment, how should it not reveal to = us something of the very essence of which these bodies are made? Action cannot move in the unreal. A mind born to speculate or to dream, I admit, might re= main outside reality, might deform or transform the real, perhaps even create it= -as we create the figures of men and animals that our imagination cuts out of t= he passing cloud. But an intellect bent upon the act to be performed and the reaction to follow, feeling its object so as to get its mobile impression at every instant, is an intellect that touches something of the absolute. Would the idea ever have occurred to us to doubt this absolute value of our knowl= edge if philosophy had not shown us what contradictions our speculation meets, w= hat dead-locks it ends in? But these difficulties and contradictions all arise = from trying to apply the usual forms of our thought to objects with which our industry has nothing to do, and for which, therefore, our molds are not mad= e. Intellectual knowledge, in so far as it relates to a certain aspect of inert matter, ought, on the contrary, to give us a faithful imprint of it, having been stereotyped on this particular object. It becomes relative
(xii) only if it claims, such as it is, to present to us life--that is to
say, the maker of the stereotype-plate.
Must we then give up fathoming the depths of life? Must we keep to that
mechanistic idea of it which the understanding will always give us-an idea
necessarily artificial and symbolical, since it makes the total activity of
life shrink to the form of a certain human activity which is only a partial=
and
local manifestation of life, a result or by-product of the vital process? We
should have to do so, indeed, if life had employed all the psychical
potentialities it possesses in producing pure understandings-that is to say=
, in
making geometricians. But the line of evolution that ends in man is not the
only one. On other paths, divergent from it, other forms of consciousness h=
ave
been developed, which have not been able to free themselves from external
constraints or to regain control over themselves, as the human intellect has
done, but which, none the less, also express something that is immanent and
essential in the evolutionary movement. Suppose these other forms of
consciousness brought together and amalgamated with intellect: would not the
result be a consciousness as wide as life? And such a consciousness, turning
around suddenly against the push of life which it feels behind, would have a
vision of life complete-would it not?-even though the vision were fleeting.=
It will be said that, even so, we do not transcend our intellect, for it= is still with our intellect, and through our intellect, that we see the other forms of consciousness. And this would be right if we were pure intellects,= if there did not remain, around our conceptual and logical thought, a vague nebulosity, made of the very substance out of which has been formed the luminous nucleus that we call the intellect. Therein reside certain powers = that are
(xiii) complementary to the understanding, powers of which we have only = an indistinct feeling when we remain shut up in ourselves, but which will beco= me clear and distinct when they perceive themselves at work, so to speak, in t= he evolution of nature. They will thus learn what sort of effort they must mak= e to be intensified and expanded in the very direction of life.
This amounts to saying that theory of knowledge and theory = of life seem to us inseparable. A theory of life that is not accompanied = by a criticism of knowledge is obliged to accept, as they stand, the concepts wh= ich the understanding puts at its disposal: it can but enclose the facts, willi= ng or not, in pre-existing frames which it regards as ultimate. It thus obtain= s a symbolism which is convenient, perhaps even necessary to positive science, = but not a direct vision of its object. On the other hand, a theory of knowledge which does not replace the intellect in the general evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames of knowledge have been constructed nor how = we can enlarge or go beyond them. It is necessary that these two inquiries, th= eory of knowledge and theory of life, should join each other, and, by a circular process, push each other on unceasingly.
Together, they may solve by a method more sure, brought nearer to experience, the great problems that philosophy poses. For, if they should succeed in their common enterprise, they would show us the formation of the intellect, and thereby the genesis of that matter of which our intellect tr= aces the general configuration. They would dig to the very root of nature and of mind. They would substitute for the false evolutionism of Spencer-which consists in cutting up present reality, already evolved, into little bits no less evolved, and then recomposing it
(xiv) with these fragments, thus positing in advance everything that is = to be explained--a true evolutionism, in which reality would be followed in its generation and its growth.
But a philosophy of this kind will not be made in a day. Unlike the philosophical systems properly so called, each of which was the individual = work of a man of genius and sprang up as a whole, to be taken or left, it will o= nly be built up by the collective and progressive effort of many thinkers, of m= any observers also, completing, correcting and improving one another. So the present essay does not aim at resolving at once the greatest problems. It simply desires to define the method and to permit a glimpse, on some essent= ial points, of the possibility of its application.
Its plan is traced by the subject itself. In the first chapter, we try on the evolutionary progress the two ready-made garments that our understanding puts at our disposal, mechanism and finality;[1] we show t= hat they do not fit, neither the one nor the other, but that one of them might = be recut and resewn, and in this new form fit less badly than the other. In or= der to transcend the point of view of the understanding, we try, in our second = chapter, to reconstruct the main lines of evolution along which life
(xv) has traveled by the side of that which has led to the human intelle= ct. The intellect is thus brought back to its generating cause, which we then h= ave to grasp in itself and follow in its movement. It is an effort of this kind that we attempt-incompletely indeed-in our third chapter. A fourth and last part is meant to show how our understanding itself, by submitting to a cert= ain discipline, might prepare a philosophy which transcends it. For that, a gla= nce over the history of systems became necessary, together with an analysis of = the two great illusions to which, as soon as it speculates on reality in genera= l, the human understanding is exposed.